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COMMENTS
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS TO TRANSFERS OF
STOCK APPURTENANT TO THE SALE OF
A BUSINESS-THE GOLDEN
OPPORTUNITY LOST: GOLDEN V.
GARAFALO
Comprehensive regulation of the securities industry began
with the enactment of the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 19342 (the Acts). Collectively, the Acts
Ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)).
2 Ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)). Prior
to the '33 and '34 Acts, legislation regulating securities transactions included the English
Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, the Mail Fraud Act, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1130
(1909) (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1976)), the Interstate Commerce Commission laws gov-
erning securities issued by common carriers, see Transportation Act, ch. 91, § 439, 41 Stat.
494 (1920) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), as well as state
Blue Sky legislation, see, e.g., Fraudulent Practices In Respect to Stocks, Bonds and Other
Securities Act, ch. 649, § 352-359-a, [1921] N.Y. Laws 1989 (codified as amended at N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1981-1982)). For a comparison of the
English Companies Act of 1929 and the Securities Act of 1933, see Hanna & Turlington,
The Securities Act of 1933, 28 ILL. L. REv. 482, 499-502 (1933).
Passage of the '33 and '34 Acts was a response to the inability of individual states to
regulate interstate traffic of securities in the "boom and bust" period of the 1920's. See M.
PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 5-14 (1970). The states were powerless
to prohibit securities fraud perpetrated outside their own borders. The '33 Act eliminated
this loophole by abrogating the protection afforded to sales made in interstate commerce if
the particular securities were sold in violation of state laws. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1933). Thus, the '33 Act requires that securities intended for interstate commerce
be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f (1976
& Supp. IV 1980). The Act also proscribes fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securi-
ties. Id. § 77q (1976). The '34 Act, on the other hand, requires that any national securities
exchange making use of the mails or any means of interstate commerce register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. §§ 78e, 78f. The Act also includes, inter
alia, margin requirements, id. § 78g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), restrictions on borrowing by
members, brokers, and dealers, id. § 78h (1976), and a prohibition against manipulation of
security prices, id. § 78i.
Federal regulation of securities transactions continued after the '33 and '34 Acts with
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were designed to protect the unwary investor from fraud by com-
pelling full and fair disclosure by public corporations of informa-
tion related to the issuance and trading of instruments3 commonly
considered to be securities. A number of transactions, however,
the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, §§ 1-33, 49 Stat.
803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) (protects inves-
tors, consumers and the general public from securities fraud, excessive charges to subsidiary
public utility companies, obstruction of state regulation, and inefficiency by public utility
holding companies), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, §§ 301-328, 53 Stat. 1149
(codified as ainended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976)) (protects investors in notes,
bonds, debentures, evidences of indebtedness, and certificates of interest), the Investment
Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 72,
107; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) (protects the national public interest
and the interest of investors from lack of adequate information when dealing with securities
issued by investment companies), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 201-
221, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980))
(mandates registration of investment advisers).
3 See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (purpose of '34 Act is
to supplant caveat emptor doctrine for a policy of full disclosure); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (purposes of '33 Act are "to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to
protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (purpose of '33 Act is to protect
investors through the requirement of "full disclosure by issuers of securities"); SEC v. Capi-
tal Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (purpose of federal securities laws
is to maintain a high level of ethical standards in the securities field). In Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court emphasized that the Securities Act of 1933 was
"[d]esigned to protect investors," and to prevent fraud by requiring full disclosure by issu-
ers, underwriters, and dealers regarding the nature of securities sold in interstate and for-
eign commerce. Id. at 431 (footnote omitted); see A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines
Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941) (essential purpose of '33 Act is to protect investors). Some of
the abuses in the securities markets that prompted the enactment of the '33 Act included
the institution of "dummy directors" whose sole function was to provide "snobbery appeal,"
the failure to provide adequate information to prospective investors, the abuse of the proxy
mechanism by self-perpetuating directorships, and "insider" trading for personal gain. 1 L.
Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 19-20 (1961 & Supp. 1962).
4 The '33 Act defines "security" as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires -
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,. . . in-
vestment contract, . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). The '33 and '34 Acts' definitions of a security are virtually indis-
tinguishable and have been accorded the same meaning by the Supreme Court. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.7 (1979). One commentator has
defined a security as a "transaction whose characteristics distinguish it from the generality
of transactions so as to create a need for the special fraud procedures, protections, and
remedies provided by the securities laws." Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security".
Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967); cf. Fitz-
Gibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the
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have not qualified for the protection afforded by the Acts.' In par-
ticular, courts increasingly have recognized the sale-of-business
doctrine, which removes from the purview of the federal securities
laws any sale of assets and stock in a corporation over which the
purchaser intends to assume management and exert control.' Re-
Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 919 (1980) ("A security is a financial instrument
eligible to participate in a public market.").
6 The '33 Act itself exempts several transactions from registration, including those un-
dertaken by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, and those undertaken
by an issuer but which do not involve a public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). In addition, the courts have considered several instruments to be outside the scope of
the federal securities laws. E.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858
(1975) (shares of stock in a cooperative housing project); LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC
Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (standby commitment obligating
federal credit union to purchase Government National Mortgage Association securities);
Hackford v. First Sec. Bank, 521 F. Supp. 541, 553-56 (D. Utah 1981) (range company stock
proposed for sale by bank as trustee). One district court, in holding that notes tied to the
prime rate were not securities, ventured that "a great deal of information would be required
in order to allege jurisdiction whenever a claim was based on an instrument that falls in the
'gray area' between a clearly commercial and clearly investment instrument." LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 531 F. Supp. 702, 706-07 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1980).
6 See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982) (private sale of all stock
in a heating and air conditioning business); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465-
66 (7th Cir. 1981) (sale of 100% of stock in a machine-parts corporation); Chandler v. Kew,
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir. 1977)
(sale of 100% of stock in a liquor business); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F.
Supp. 659, 661, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (sale of controlling shares in three closely held corpora-
tions); Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 272 S.E.2d 314, 316-17
(1980) (sale of three corporations accomplished by pledge of all the shares of capital stock).
See generally Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637, 644-56 (1982) (discussion of recent
sale-of-business cases).
In Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981),
the Seventh Circuit determined that the sale of 100% of the assets and stock of a marina
corporation did not fall within the ambit of the federal securities laws because, inter alia,
"[tihe stock. . . merely was passed incidentally as an indicia of ownership of the business
assets sold . . . ." Id. at 1151-52. Additionally, in Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the purchaser acquired a substantial portion of the out-
standing shares of stock in a publicly traded corporation, with the head of the purchaser
corporation becoming the chairman of the board of the seller corporation. Id. at 380, 383.
The chairman intended to rely upon present management for daily operations, and asserted
that the acquisition of stock was for investment purposes. Id. at 380. The court found that
the purchaser owned the business and controlled the resources and management, and that
the chairman had the power to hire new employees or fire existing officers. Id. at 383-84.
Thus, the court held that since the shares of stock were acquired as an indicia of ownership,
and not for investment purposes, the federal securities laws did not apply. Id.; see SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973). But see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1263
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
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cently, however, in Golden v. Garafalo,7 the Second Circuit, re-
jecting the sale-of-business doctrine, held that conventional shares
of a close corporation which possess the characteristics commonly
associated with stock are securities within the meaning of the Acts,
notwithstanding the purchaser's intention to manage and control
the business.
8
In Golden, the plaintiffs purchased 100 percent of the out-
standing stock of the defendant's ticket brokerage corporation, in-
tending to manage the business directly.9 The transfer was effectu-
ated by a sale of shares, rather than assets, because the
corporation's leasehold rights to office space were nonassignable.10
The purchasers subsequently brought an action under the federal
securities laws,11 alleging that the defendant had misrepresented
the value of the shares of stock.12 The plaintiffs also pleaded com-
mon-law breach of contract, breach of a restrictive covenant agree-
ment, fraud, and violation of a state securities statute.13 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the action, concluding that, under the sale-of-busi-
ness doctrine, the shares were not securities within the meaning of
the Acts.14
7 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
8 Id. at 1144. The court determined that there was little reason for the framers of the
'33 and '34 Acts to use terms such as "stock," "treasury stock," or "voting-trust certificate,"
unless they intended to include the common definitions of those instruments. Id. The court
opined that Congress intended to draft an expansive definition and "to include with speci-
ficity all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the commercial world ... ." Id.
Catch-all phrases such as "investment contract" were added, noted the Golden court, to
cover unique instruments that are not easily classified. Id.
9 Id. at 1140.
10 Id.
n Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Collectively,
these provisions proscribe fraud, deception, and nondisclosure in transactions involving se-
curities, where an instrument of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national securities ex-
change is utilized. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
12 678 F.2d at 1140.
13 Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d
Cir. 1982).
14 521 F. Supp. at 358. The district court found that the "protective purpose of the
federal legislation is not implicated" because the stock was not publicly traded and the
plaintiffs did not entrust their capital to an investor hoping to reap a profit. Id. Judge Con-
ner reasoned that if the federal securities laws did apply, "the transfer of any conceivable
item" would be within the purview of the Acts as long as the transfer was structured as the
purchase and sale of the stock of a corporation and the stock was held out as an asset of the
corporation. Id. The federal laws should not apply, concluded the district court, because
they "were not designed to usurp the common law where the reality of the transaction is the
transfer of a tangible item for the use of the purchaser." Id.
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On appeal, a divided Second Circuit panel reversed, 5 holding
that the federal securities laws were applicable to transactions in-
volving conventional stock in business corporations, notwithstand-
ing the purchaser's intent to assume total ownership and control of
the business." Judge Winter, writing for the majority, 7 initially
discussed the tripartite "economic reality" test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,' a decision that forms
one component of the sale-of-business doctrine. The "Howey test,"
which is used to ascertain the existence of an investment contract
within the meaning of the '33 and '34 Acts," examines whether
there is an investment in a common venture, premised upon a rea-
sonable expectation of profits, to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.20 According to the
Howey Court, if the transaction at issue satisfies all three criteria,
an investment contract within the meaning of the Acts will be
deemed present and the federal securities laws thus will apply, re-
gardless of the name attached to the particular instrument.2 '
Turning to the second basis of support for the sale-of-business
15 678 F.2d at 1140.
10 Id. The SEC submitted an amicus curiae memorandum to the Golden court, stating
its position that the sale of a business through the transfer of a controlling stock interest is a
sale of securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws. See [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,453 (1982). The Commission argued that the district
court decision was in conflict with both the letter and spirit of the '33 and '34 Acts, and thus
abridged the protections afforded to buyers of common stock under those laws. Id. at 92,677.
The Commission then emphasized that the term "security" is defined broadly in both the
'33 and '34 Acts to include any "stock." Id.
1 The majority consisted of Circuit Judges Newman and Winter. Senior Circuit Judge
Lumbard filed a dissent.
Is 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
1 The Howey Court initiated the "economic reality" test in order to determine whether
the offering of units in a citrus grove development, together with a "service contract" for
cultivating, marketing and remitting the net proceeds to the investor, was an "investment
contract" within the definition of a security in the Acts. Id. at 299-300; see Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 417-23 (5th Cir.) (purchase of joint venture interests in a parcel of
undeveloped real estate held to be an investment contract), cert..denied, 102 S. Ct. 396
(1981); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (purchase of
participation interest in a note held not to be an investment contract); Peyton v. Morrow
Elec., Inc., 587 F.2d 413, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1978) (employment contracts involving investment
of manager's services and a stock purchase held not to be investment contracts); Long, An
Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24
OKLA. L. REv. 135, 139-46 (1971).
10 678 F.2d at 1141; see Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A
Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of
Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 407, 409-35 (1973).
21 See 328 U.S. at 301.
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doctrine, the Second Circuit observed that United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman22 requires that a "two-part, seriatim test"
be used, rather than an automatic application of the Howey test, to
determine whether shares of stock are "securities" within the
meaning of the Acts.23 Interpreting Forman, the court declared
that the "economic reality" test of Howey need only be applied to
ascertain whether a stock is an investment contract, and thus a
"security" within the meaning of the Acts, if the shares do not pos-
sess the characteristics of conventional corporate stock.24 The
Golden court then stated that the legislative history of the Acts
evidenced congressional intent to include in the term "stock," in-
struments, such as those transferred in Golden, "which have the
characteristics associated with ordinary, conventional shares of
stock. ' 25 If the "economic reality" test routinely were applied to
determine whether conventional stock should fall within the ambit
of the Acts, reasoned the court, uncertainty as to the precise scope
of the Acts would be created, thereby generating "slippery legal
and factual issues. '26 Finally, the court exhibited a pervasive fear
of future applications of the sale of business doctrine, focusing
upon its elusiveness as a legal concept.27 Judge Winter predicted
that if the doctrine's "intent to manage the corporation" standard
were adopted, it would lead to countless issues of mixed fact and
law.28 Had Congress wished to narrow the protection of the Acts by
22 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
23 678 F.2d at 1144. In Forman, the Supreme Court identified the following five "com-
mon features of stock": (1) receipt of dividends contingent upon profitability; (2) negotiabil-
ity; (3) the ability to be "pledged or hypothecated"; (4) voting rights proportionate to per-
centage of ownership; and (5) the potential to appreciate in value. 421 U.S. at 851, cited in
Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir.
1982). The plaintiffs in Forman were tenants who purchased shares of stock in a state subsi-
dized housing cooperative. 421 U.S. at 841. Because the shares of stock lacked the five "com-
mon features of stock," the Court held that they were not "stock" within the meaning of the
'33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 851; see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967).
24 678 F.2d at 1144. But see Brodsky, When Sale of Stock is Not Sale of Security,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
25 678 F.2d at 1144; see United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 865 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Comment, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase
of Corporate Stock: An Argument for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 295, 315 (1980) (to be considered a security, stock exhibiting "traditional
characteristics" must be accompanied by "inducements to purchasers of further
development").
28 678 F.2d at 1145.
27 Id.
28 Id. Exemplary of the potential for mixed questions of law and fact is Reprosystem,
B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1273-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), wherein the court relied
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expressly adopting the sale-of-business doctrine, concluded the
majority, it undoubtedly would have done so."
Judge Lumbard dissented, asserting that the majority miscon-
strued Forman by holding that once an instrument is found to pos-
sess the common characteristics of corporate stock, the application
of the "economic reality" test is foreclosed. The two parts of the
Forman opinion, argued Judge Lumbard, were structural and not
substantive, since the Court merely was responding to the circuit
court's alternate grounds for its own decision.30 In addition, the
dissent criticized the majority's reliance upon Supreme Court au-
thority to support the view that "ordinary stocks" should be
treated as "securities" under the Acts,3 1 noting that the cases cited
by the majority actually favor a more restrictive interpretation of
the scope of the federal securities laws.32 With respect to the par-
ticular plaintiffs involved in the case, Judge Lumbard reasoned
that they did not need the protection of the securities laws because
they themselves were capable of protecting their investment.3 s Fi-
nally, Judge Lumbard discounted the majority's concern that
adoption of the sale-of-business doctrine would allow the applica-
tion of the '33 and '34 Acts to turn upon uncertain factors, observ-
upon evidence of the purchaser's intent to manage the business in order to conclude that
the negotiated sale of the defendant's stock and assets in its operating subsidiaries did not
involve a "security" within the purview of the Acts. Id. at 1274. In Golden, the defendant,
Garafalo, entered into a consulting agreement with the plaintiffs whereby Garafalo would
provide consulting services to the ticket brokerage business for $100 per day, with such
services not to exceed 150 days during 1981. 678 F.2d at 1147 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). The
purchasers were, however, to operate the business as they saw fit. Id. (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting).
29 678 F.2d at 1147.
30 Id. at 1148 (Lumbard, J., dissenting); see United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 (1975). Judge Lumbard reasoned that the Forman Court applied a two-part
test simply in response to the Second Circuit's holding on alternate grounds, see Forman v.
Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252-55 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), namely, that the cooperative shares fell within
the literal meaning of "security" in the '33 and '34 Acts, and that the shares constituted an
"investment contract" under the Howey test. 678 F.2d at 1148 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
Judge Lumbard then posited that the Forman Court neither required the application of a
two-part test nor foreclosed an examination of the economic reality of the transaction once a
determination was made that an instrument possesses the common characteristics of corpo-
rate stock. Id. (Lumbard, J., dissenting); see Seldin, supra note 6, at 665-69 (Forman read
to support the proposition that an economic reality test is always appropriate).
31 678 F.2d at 1148-49 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
32 Id. (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1149 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (citing Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of
Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 249
(1974)).
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ing that courts which regularly apply the doctrine experience no
undue difficulties. 34
The Second Circuit's decision in Golden comports with the
generally accepted view that the federal securities laws are to be
construed flexibly in order to protect the investing public from
fraud and nondisclosure.3 5 Inquiry into the legislative history of
the federal securities laws, and consideration of relevant Supreme
Court precedent, however, support the position that an extension
of federal protection is not warranted in a typical sale-of-business
transaction. In atypical or problematic situations, where the intent
and status of the parties is unclear, it is suggested that the Ninth
Circuit's "managerial efforts" standard be utilized to determine
whether the federal securities laws are applicable to the transac-
tion in question.
THE FEDERAL SEcuRITIEs LAWS AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Golden court concluded that if the legislature were dis-
contented with the current scope of the Acts' protection, it would
move to remedy the situation." It is submitted, however, that the
framers of the federal securities laws already have expressed their
intent to exclude transactions from the Acts' protection when a
purchaser obtains control over the business.8 7 Indeed, the '33 Act
specifically was aimed at protecting those who possess a mere
"symbol of ownership"3 o while the power and responsibility remain
in the hands of a distinct controlling group.89 Moreover, the Act
3 678 F.2d at 1149 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). Judge Lumbard asserted that "[n]one of
the courts that have found the sale of a business not to be the sale of a security have exper-
ienced unusual difficulties in reaching that conclusion." Id. (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
31 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338
(1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); Wolf v. Wein-
stein, 372 U.S. 633, 652 n.19 (1963); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
" 678 F.2d at 1147. The Second Circuit treated the legislative history of the Acts as
ambiguous, noting that "Congress may have had good reason to rely on conventional com-
mercial and legal criteria" for classifying instruments with commonly agreed upon charac-
teristics of "stock," id. at 1145, and for "leaving 'economic reality' to govern only the catch-
all phrase 'investment contract' in cases involving unusual or unique instruments," id. at
1146. These references to the ambiguity of the legislative history of the Acts seemingly fail
to support the Golden court's opinion that Congress intended to include within the meaning
of the Acts "all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the commercial world
." Id. at 1144.
37 See infra note 40.
38 77 CONG. REc. 2955 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
39 Id.
1983l
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was designed to ensure that investors who purchase shares of stock
from an issuing company are provided with reliable information.
Neither of these congressional concerns is implicated in the factual
context of Golden. There, the purchasers obtained control over the
ticket brokerage business after the parties themselves, each repre-
sented by counsel, reached a basic agreement on terms, 41 and the
fraud allegedly perpetrated on the plaintiffs did not emanate from
the "reticence of financiers, '42 but from the misrepresentations of
the seller himself.
In contrast to the '33 Act, the '34 Act focuses upon the regula-
tion of stock exchanges and the activities of brokers and dealers.43
Again, it is apparent that these concerns are not relevant to the
arrangement at issue in Golden. The typical sale-of-business trans-
action does not involve a stock market,44 and the stocks are trans-
ferred from seller to buyer without the aid of a securities broker or
dealer. 5
The limited scope of the federal securities laws also is evi-
41 In the House debate on the '33 Act, Representative Sam Rayburn, the sponsor of the
bill, elucidated the need for full disclosure:
We have, on the one hand, 18,000,000 passive citizens having no actual contact
with their companies; on the other hand, a few hundred powerful managers di-
recting and controlling the destinies of the companies and the physical properties
which they own. The owners of these symbols are entitled to know what the sym-
bols represent. Those who are interested in purchasing these pieces of paper have
the right to demand information as to the actual condition of the issuing com-
pany. . . .These managers are truly trustees. One of their duties as trustees is to
furnish security owners, in being and in prospect, with reliable information. This
bill has been drawn to enforce that responsibility.
Id. Representative Rayburn identified the purpose of the '33 Act to be the protection of
these "18 million owners of symbols." Id. See generally 1-11 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE
SECURTIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahan
eds. 1973); Long, Introduction to Student Symposium: Interpreting the Statutory Defini-
tion of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 103 & n.29 (1974)
(securities laws were intended to protect the public from unsound investments of all kinds).
41 678 F.2d at 1147 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
43 77 CONG. Rac. 2955 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
4' See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 128 n.9
(1973). Prior to the 1929 stock market crash, the financial community was largely self-regu-
lated and strongly opposed to governmental intervention in the daily operations of the stock
exchange. Id. Despite this opposition, however, and the enormity of the task, Congress
deemed it necessary to the national public interest to eliminate abuses in the securities
industry through government regulation. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
4 E.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 343 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son,
Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir. 1977).
4' In Golden, the sale was arranged through the respective parties' attorneys. Golden v.
Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 57:572
TRANSFERS OF STOCK
denced by the inclusion of a caveat, "unless the context otherwise
requires," in both the '33 and '34 Acts.46 Case law has interpreted
this clause as alluding both to the transactional context of the in-
strument in question and to later references to particular instru-
ments in the statute itself.47 It is indeed arguable that the context
of the transaction in Golden "requires" that the transferred
"stock" be removed from coverage under the Acts. The intention
of the purchasers was to acquire a business and use its assets,48
and their decision to buy was made without relying upon the ad-
vice of others. As sophisticated business persons and proprietors of
their own ticket brokerage firm, the buyers undoubtedly were
aware of the federal securities laws.49 As the district court noted,
48 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); id. § 78c(a). The Supreme Court often has
quoted one of the most basic maxims of statutory construction in cases involving the federal
securities laws, namely, that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring), quoted in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 558 (1979); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975);
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("[A] thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.").
'I See, e.g., United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980); McGovern
Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645, 646-47 (10th Cir.
1977); C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361-63 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970, 985 (D.N.J. 1981);
Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D. Md. 1977); Seldin, supra note 6, at 652-53;
Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Pro-
visions, 35 Bus. LAw. 1567, 1577-78 (1980); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Se-
curity: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 248 (1982); Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 357, 365-66 (1978).
In Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976), the court,
considering the Acts' "unless the context otherwise requires" language, emphasized the
word "requires" and placed the burden of establishing such a context upon the party assert-
ing that the Acts did not apply. Id. at 1137-38. For a discussion of the clause as it related to
the district court decision in Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd,
678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), see Brodsky, When Stock is Not a Security, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9,
1982, at 1, col. 1.
One commentator has noted that the Forman Court determined that the name of the
instrument in question is important in assessing whether it is a "security" in situations
where "the underlying transaction [rather than merely the instrument itself] embodies some
of the significant characteristics typically associated with (rather than the legal attributes
possessed by) the named instrument." Seldin, supra note 6, at 668. It has been posited that
the transactional context of the instrument is one consideration in applying the "economic
reality" test because it may engender legitimate reliance upon the benefits and protections
of the federal securities laws. Id.
48 678 F.2d at 1140.
49 See id. In addition to their own business acumen, the purchasers and the seller in
19831
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:572
however, the plaintiffs reasonably did not rely upon the protection
of the Acts; 0 the concern of both "parties was the transfer of a
business, not the sale and purchase of stock." 51 Notably, reliance
upon the coverage of the Acts was a critical inquiry in the Forman
analysis.52 The plaintiffs in Forman were relatively unsophisticated
"investors" who purchased stock in a cooperative apartment. 3 The
Forman Court stated that it was unreasonable to infer that the
Golden had the benefit of counsel during the final steps of the negotiations. Id. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that even in sales of small businesses, the parties to the transaction
generally will not consider whether the securities laws apply. Comment, supra note 25, at
316-17. It has been argued that the courts should consider whether there was reliance upon
the Acts only if proof of actual reliance upon federal protection can be shown, as when
inducements made by a promoter include the claim that the securities laws apply. Id. at 317
n.134. See generally Rapp, The Role of Promotional Characteristics in Determining the
Existence of a Security, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 26, 45-47 (1981) (purchaser's expectation of invest-
ment-type benefits induced by promoter is fundamental element of securities transaction).
50 Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d
Cir. 1982).
61 Id. The district court observed that the parties' structuring of the deal as a stock
transfer was "merely a technicality dictated by a provision in a lease." Id.; see Seldin, supra
note 6, at 655-56. The Second Circuit in Golden relied upon Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc.,
596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), which rejected the sale-of-busi-
ness doctrine because the parties "chose to implement their plan for joint ownership by
means of a stock transfer rather than a partnership agreement or a sale of assets." 596 F.2d
at 1204, quoted in Golden, 678 F.2d at 1145. By contrast, the parties in Golden were forced
to consummate their transaction by a sale of stock because of the nonassignable lease. 678 at
1140.
52 See 678 F.2d at 1143-44. The Forman Court stated:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do not
suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security.
There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name such as "stocks" or
"bonds" will lead- a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws
apply. This would clearly be the case when the underlying transaction embodies
some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named
instrument.
421 U.S. at 850-51. In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981), the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that the sale of 100% of the stock of a machine-parts corporation
did not give rise to a justifiable assumption that the federal securities laws applied. Id. at
466 n.7. Even though the stock had the characteristics of ordinary stock, the court noted
that the purchaser acquired total control over those characteristics. Id. This meant, for ex-
ample, that the purchaser could confer dividends on itself at will. Id. Thus, the stock was
not ordinary capital stock and did not justify the purchaser's reliance upon the Acts. Id. But
see Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 378, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[T]he
expectations, subjective intentions and motivations of parties do not determine whether the
federal securities laws apply . . . ."); Brodsky, supra note 47, at 2, col. 2.
-- 421 U.S. 837, 840 (1975). One commentator has suggested that the unsophisticated
investor is the type of investor the Acts were designed to protect. Brodsky, supra note 47, at
2, col. 2-3; see Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," 14 REV. SEC. REG. 981, 985
(1981).
1983] TRANSFERS OF STOCK
plaintiffs anticipated protection under the '33 and '34 Acts since
their shares were purchased solely for housing, rather than invest-
ment, purposes.54 Lack of reliance upon federal protection, in the
Forman analysis,55 thus militates against the finding of a "secur-
ity" within the meaning of the Acts56 and removes a sale-of-busi-
ness transaction from their coverage.
Finally, it should be noted that, unlike many other areas of
federal regulation, the securities field lacks any indication of con-
gressional intent to preempt applicable state law.5s In fact, the Su-
preme Court, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware,59 observed that any Securities and Exchange Commission
rule or practice that was not "germane" to the purposes of the '34
Act6" "would not appear under the shadow of the federal umbrella;
it is, instead, subject to applicable state law."6" It is suggested that
the rationale employed in Ware is equally applicable to a sale-of-
business situation. Hence, whenever there are adequate remedies
available under state law, and particularly when plaintiffs have not
relied affirmatively upon the Acts, the limited protection afforded
by the federal securities laws apparently is not implicated.2
54 421 U.S. at 851; see Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd,
678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
Il 421 U.S. at 850-61.
8 See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 466 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981); cf. Hirsch v.
duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (an investor who assumes managerial con-
trol gains access to information and thus has a lesser need of federal securities law protec-
tion), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
'7 See, e.g., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 56-60 (1981) (serviceman's beneficiary
designation under a life insurance policy issued pursuant to the Serviceman's Group Life
Insurance Act of 1965 prevails over a constructive trust imposed upon the policy proceeds
by a state court decree); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981)
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempts state law purporting to pro-
hibit workers' compensation benefits from being used to offset pension benefits); Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) (regulation of immigration and naturalization is an exclu-
sively federal concern and any state action is preempted); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282,
286 (1971) ("state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
federal [Aid to Families With Dependent Children] standards violates the Social Security
Act" and is preempted).
58 Section 28(a) of the '34 Act provides that "[tihe rights and remedies provided by this
Chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights that may exist at law or in equity
...." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). The Act notes that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect
the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State . . . insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." Id.
" 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
60 Id. at 130-31; see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
01 414 U.S. at 130-31.
02 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (Court is reluctant to
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SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF "SECURITIES" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE ACTS
The Golden court prefaced its discussion of Supreme Court
precedent with a recognition that neither Howey nor Forman, nor
the more recent decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver,6 3 were con-
trolling authority on the sale-of-business doctrine.6 4 To be sure, all
three cases examined unusual arrangements that did not involve
conventional shares of stock. The question to be considered under
the sale-of-business doctrine, however, is whether conventional
shares of stock, as instruments specifically referred to in the Acts'
definition of a "security," invariably should be deemed "securities"
without any inquiry into the underlying transaction. Relying
largely upon its interpretation of Forman, the Golden court an-
swered this question affirmatively. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that a different analytical approach, drawn from a closer reading of
the relevant Supreme Court decisions, is in fact proper. Inquiry
into the economic realities of the underlying transaction, the test
generated by Howey and normally invoked to determine whether
unusual arrangements are "investment contracts" within the
meaning of the Acts, should be pursued even when transfers of
conventional stock are at issue. Such a method of evaluation flows
from the language of Forman,65 and is supported further by the
preambles to the definitional sections of the Acts, which refer to
the transactional context of the particular instrument. This anal-
ysis recognizes that all sales of stock are not necessarily sales of
securities, and, thus, justifies application of the sale of business
override established state policies of corporate regulation dealing with transactions in secur-
ities). In analyzing further the concept of reliance, it is submitted that in situations where
the instrument need not be registered with the SEC, reliance upon the antifraud provisions
of the Acts by the purchaser should not be assumed. The Supreme Court has never consid-
ered whether a security could be held to exist for the purpose of the antifraud, but not the
registration provisions of the Acts, although the court of appeals in Daniel did intimate in
dictum that such an anomaly might exist. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223, 1240 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 419 U.S. 551 (1979); see Seldin, supra note 6, at 638
n.3.
63 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
64 678 F.2d at 1143.
"5 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 848. The Forman Court specifically objected to employment
of a literal approach, rejecting the argument that a "transaction, evidenced by the sale of
shares called 'stock,' must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory
definition of a security includes the words 'any... stock."' Id. (footnote omitted). The
Court cited favorably the economic reality approach taken in Tcherepnin and Howey. Id.
" See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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doctrine in a case such as Golden."
The Second Circuit also interpreted the sale-of-business doc-
trine to be more than an incremental extension of Forman.e8 It is
submitted, however, that the Supreme Court implicitly has sanc-
tioned the doctrine by emphasizing the substance of the transac-
tion and the intent of the parties, while disregarding the form of
the transfer and the name attached to the instrument in ques-
tion. 19 Indeed, the Court has stated that, when determining the
meaning of "security" as used in the Acts, "form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic re-
ality."70 In Golden, although the form of the transaction was a sale
17 678 F.2d at 1142. Judge Winter reasoned that if the sale-of-business doctrine were
valid, it would apply to Golden. Id. Significantly, Golden has been deemed an especially
apposite case for application of the sale-of-business doctrine because the transaction was
structured as a stock sale to avoid the nonassignment clause in the defendant's lease, the
plaintiffs intended to assume complete control over the ticket brokerage business, and there
was no serious question as to the plaintiffs' lack of reliance upon the entrepreneurial efforts
of the defendant. Seldin, supra note 6, at 655-56. In light of the appropriateness of Golden
for application of the sale-of-business doctrine, it is suggested that the court's rigid literalist
approach stemmed from its fear that in future cases, there would be uncertain applications
of the sale-of-business doctrine.
'8 See 678 F.2d at 1142-43. The court noted that the sale-of-business doctrine treats
stock as a security in some instances and not in others, and that prior cases have focused
upon the nature of the instrument, rather than the specific transactional context. Id. It has
been argued that because the sale-of-business doctrine stresses the intent of the parties to
the transaction, shares of stock may be "securities" for purposes of one party but not for
another. Seldin, supra note 6, at 681. This anomaly is rectified when a "finer-grained" ap-
proach is taken to each transaction, viewing the situation as the transfer of distinct shares of
stock in different but related transactions. Id. at 681 n.107.
69 See 421 U.S. at 848. The Supreme Court recently has reiterated its position that
substance governs form in securities cases by closely scrutinizing transactions that involve
unusual instruments and restricting the scope of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (SEC is required to establish scienter in rule 10b-5 ac-
tions); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (duty to disclose under section
10(b) of the '34 Act "does not arise from mere possession of nonpublic market informa-
tion"); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1976) (pur-
chaser of convertible debentures is liable as beneficial owner for profiteering from insider
information in subsequent sale of stock only if he was such an owner prior to the purchase);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (private damages action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 must allege scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (private damages action under rule 10b-5 is confined to actual pur-
chasers or sellers of securities). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891, 892-900
(1977) (section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 litigation); Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court and
the Counterrevolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REv. 335, 345-76 (1979) (discus-
sion of Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder).
70 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (emphasis added). There are at least
three, and possibly four, different versions of the "economic reality" test. Schneider, supra
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of stock in a ticket brokerage business, its substance was the sale
of a business for the purpose of direct control and management by
the purchasers. Such a transaction, unlike the typical shareholder
investment in a large corporation managed by financiers, was not
envisioned by Congress when it drafted the federal securities
laws.71 Moreover, even conceding that the shares transferred in
Golden carried the common characteristics of stock, such as the
right to receive dividends and voting rights, the purchasers, unlike
the ordinary investor, acquired absolute control over these traits.72
Thus, they seemingly could confer dividends upon themselves at
note 53, at 984-85. The "commercial investment dichotomy," apparently followed in the
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, places emphasis upon the third compo-
nent of the Howey formula, that is, "profits to come solely from the efforts of others." SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). When the purchaser's expectations of profit
come from his own efforts, the transaction is a commercial venture, not an investment, and
the federal securities laws do not apply. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-45
(11th Cir. 1982); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Mc-
Govern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645, 647 (10th
Cir. 1977); C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1360-63 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir.
1973). The "risk capital" test, which has been applied in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, fo-
cuses upon six criteria to determine whether the purchaser's investment represents "risk
capital" or simply a commercial loan. These factors are: (1) length of investment period;
"(2) collateral; (3) form of obligation; (4) circumstances of issuance; (5) relationship between
amount borrowed and size of borrower's business; and (6) intended use of the funds." See
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1182
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 972 (1981); see AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall
of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1978). The "literal approach," followed in the
Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, stipulates
that the federal securities laws apply when the instrument, on its face, is included expressly
in the statutory definition of a security in the Acts. See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Diversified Indus. Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 110
(D.D.C. 1979). The "strong family resemblance test," also followed in the Second Circuit,
was established in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d
Cir. 1976), when the court concluded that the federal securities laws did not apply to the
note in question because it did not bear a strong family resemblance to (1) a "note delivered
in consumer financing"; (2) a "note secured by a mortgage on a home"; (3) a "short-term
note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets"; (4) a "note evidencing a
'character' loan to a bank or to a bank customer"; (5) "short-term notes secured by an
assignment of accounts receivable"; or (6) "a note which simply formalizes an open-account
debt incurred in the ordinary course of business." Id.; see Banco Nacional de Costa Rica v.
Bremar Holdings Corp., 492 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Altman v. Knight, 431 F.
Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). By applying the foregoing criteria to determine whether a
note is a security, the Second Circuit seemingly has posited that any note containing such
qualities is within the literal meaning of the term "note" as used in the federal securities
laws. See Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144 ("all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the
commercial world" to be included within the Acts' definition of a "security").
71 See supra note 40.
72 See Seldin, supra note 6, at 655.
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will and vote all the stock as they pleased. In this respect, it is
apparent that the shares of stock in Golden and in typical sale of
business cases are unlike ordinary corporate stock.73
It also is submitted that, in attempting to interpret Supreme
Court precedent in the securities field, the Second Circuit miscon-
strued Marine Bank v. Weaver 4 and failed to consider adequately
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.7 5 The Golden
court observed that Marine Bank "lend[s] support to the view that
conventional stock is a security whether or not the underlying
transaction involves a sale of business. 1 7 6 It is arguable, however,
that Marine Bank mandates application of the Howey test to stock
transactions involving the sale of a business, notwithstanding the
fact that Howey dealt with a purported investment contract. In
Marine Bank, Chief Justice Burger twice referred to the caveat in
the Acts, "unless the context otherwise requires,"' 7 and observed
that "Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to
73 See Thompson, supra note 47, at 248. Professor Thompson emphasizes that, in de-
termining whether the protection of the Acts should be extended to the purchaser, the focus
should be upon whether the underlying transaction, not the instrument itself, embodies
some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument. Id.;
see Seldin, supra note 6, at 668. In Golden, neither the underlying transaction, which was
intended as the sale of a business and not an investment scheme, nor the instruments trans-
ferred, which gave the purchasers total control over voting rights and the distribution of
dividends, embodied the significant characteristics of ordinary corporate stock. Thus, the
purchasers could not reasonably have relied upon the protection of the federal securities
laws. See supra note 47.
7' 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982). In Marine Bank, the plaintiffs pledged a certificate of deposit
with the issuing bank in order to secure a loan to a corporation. 102 S. Ct. at 1222. In
consideration of the collateral, the corporation then agreed to provide certain benefits to the
plaintiff, including a portion of any profits. Id. The Court held that the certificate of deposit
was not a security because of the fixed rate of interest, virtual guarantee of full payment,
and abundant protection under the federal banking laws. Id. at 1224-25. The separate agree-
ment between the plaintiffs and the corporation was held not to be a security because it did
not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security," did not have equivalent values to most
persons, could not be traded publicly, and, significantly, afforded the plaintiffs a measure of
control over the business of the corporation. Id. at 1225 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)).
7- 439 U.S. 551 (1979). For a discussion of the Daniel decision, see Bowers, Daniel
Thrown to the Lions: An Analysis of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 18
AM. Bus. L.J. 39 (1980); Note, Securities Law: The Exclusion of Noncontributory, Compul-
sory Pension Plans-International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 5 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 191 (1980); Comment, Securities Law-Applicability of the Securities Acts to Non-
contributory, Compulsory Pension Plans-International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 159 (1980).
78 678 F.2d at 1143.
77 102 S. Ct. at 1223, 1225.
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provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud. '7 8 Indeed, Marine
Bank appears to have refined the Howey formula 9 by additionally
requiring that, in order for the securities laws to apply, there be a
showing that: (1) offers were made to several potential investors
and the interest was not offered appurtenant to a private transac-
tion; (2) the instruments in question have equivalent values to the
general public and could be traded publicly; and, (3) the particular
instrument contains no material features either unique to the
plaintiff or generally uncharacteristic of a security.80 Seemingly,
the sale of the ticket brokerage business in Golden did not satisfy
this refined Howey standard because offers were not made to a
number of potential investors and the shares of stock were offered
as part of a private transaction. 1
In Daniel, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Howey test
"embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the
Court's decisions defining a security. 8 2 The Daniel Court held
that the Acts did not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pen-
sion plan .8 Although enunciated in the context of a purported in-
vestment contract, the Court observed, the test nonetheless is to
be applied to conventional stock in light of "the substance - the
economic realities of the transaction - rather than the names that
may have been employed by the parties. ' 84 The Supreme Court
also concluded that, in light of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974,85 an extension of the securities acts to the
pension plan in question would serve no general purpose.88
78 Id. at 1223 (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir.
1976)); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974)).
79 See Pitt, 'Weaver' Could Invite New Generation of Litigation, Legal Times Wash.,
Mar. 15, 1982, at 18.
80 102 S. Ct. at 1225.
81 See 678 F.2d at 1140.
82 439 U.S. at 558 n.11 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)).
83 439 U.S. at 570; see Salazar v. Sandia Corp., 656 F.2d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 1981);
Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 299, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Adams v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 670 F.2d 387, 401 (3d Cir. 1982);
Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" 439 U.S. at 558 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52
(1975)).
85 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act vests the Department of
Labor with power to oversee private pension plans. Id. §§ 1131-1135. See generally Com-
ment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 663-66 (1975).
86 439 U.S. at 569-70.
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Taken together, Marine Bank and Daniel reflect the Supreme
Court's recent tendency to restrict the scope of the federal securi-
ties laws, 7 contrary to the Golden result. In both cases, the Court
emphasized that protection was afforded by sources other than the
federal securities laws 8 and, therefore, that the Acts' protection
was not necessary. 9 Similarly, the parties in Golden were pro-
tected effectively by state securities regulations.90
INTENT TO MANAGE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
The greater part of the Golden court's rationale for rejecting
the sale of business doctrine centered around its fear that any in-
quiry into a purchaser's intent is too subjective to function as an
evidentiary standard. The Second Circuit warned that "[i]f intent
to manage is relevant, adoption of the doctrine will lead to count-
less issues of mixed fact and law.""' Specifically, the court ques-
tioned whether part-time managers and controlling shareholders
who occasionally make significant management decisions would be
held to have "an intent to manage," and also noted the uncertain
status of new investors who are employed by the business in a
vague capacity, or who buy shares of stock with no intent to man-
age but later are required to make major decisions for the business
because of unforeseen circumstances.2 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc.,9 3 the Ninth Circuit adopted a versatile test to
87 See supra note 67.
88 See supra note 74; text accompanying notes 85-86.
89 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
90 Section 352 of the New York General Business Law empowers the Attorney General
of the State of New York to investigate instances where "any person. . . corporation. . . or
any agent or employee thereof. . . [has] employed . . . any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud" in sales of securities. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(1) (McKinney 1968). For judicial
construction of the statute, see Charles H. Greenthal & Co., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 32 N.Y.2d
457, 462-63, 299 N.E.2d 657, 658-59, 346 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-37 (1973); Gardner v. Lefkowitz,
97 Misc. 2d 806, 811-13, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740, 745-46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
91 678 F.2d at 1145-46.
82 Id. One commentator has suggested that a factor which may bear upon the question
of intent to manage is whether the purchaser has previous managerial experience in the type
of business being purchased, or whether he or she possesses the "requisite general
knowledge, sophistication or managerial skill to take responsibility." Seldin, supra note 6, at
679. All of these factors apparently were present in Golden. See 678 F.2d at 1147 (Lumbard,
J., dissenting).
93 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Turner Enterprises in-
volved a Florida corporation that sold public contracts characterized as self-improvement
courses. Id. at 477-78. The corporation, a subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
conducted a "pyramid" operation whereby some of the purchasers of the self-improvement
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:572
determine whether an instrument is an investment contract.94 It is
submitted that the same test may be used to ascertain whether a
shareholder qualifies for the protection afforded by the federal se-
curities laws in the problematic situations mentioned by the
Golden court.
Under the Turner Enterprises standard, the critical inquiry is
"whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."95 This test is
a modification of the third component of the Howey "economic re-
ality" test, which assesses the expectation of profits "solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party."9 " Under the Ninth
Circuit's approach, a purchaser's reliance upon the "essential man-
agerial efforts of others" establishes an investment contract within
courses became "independent sales trainees," enabling them to sell the courses to others and
receive a commission. Id. at 478. Even though the purchaser invested some of his own ef-
forts in the scheme, the court held that the contracts were securities because "the require-
ment that profits come 'solely' from the efforts of others would, in circumstances such as
these, lead to unrealistic results if applied dogmatically, and that a more flexible approach is
appropriate." Id. at 483; see Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1979); American
Grain Ass'n v. Canfield, Burch & Mancuso, 530 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D. La. 1982); West-
lake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 342-43 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See generally Comment, What is
a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, and Franchise Agreements, 22 KAN. L. REv. 55, 70-
78 (1973).
" The Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits also follow the Ninth Circuit "managerial
efforts" test. See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 939 (1979); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877, 879 (10th Cir.
1978); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974). For variations
of the Howey formula in state courts, see Burke v. State, 385 So. 2d 648, 651-52 (Ala. 1980);
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815-16, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 648-49, 485
P.2d 105, 108-09 (1971). See generally Carney & Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's
Struggle With the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORy L.J. 73, 80-96, 102-08 (1981).
95 474 F.2d at 482. The managerial efforts issue has been important in determining
whether a "security" exists in partnership transactions. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473
F.2d 430, 436 (10th Cir. 1973); Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assocs., 411 F. Supp. 287, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 553
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint
Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581, 596-615 (1972) (discussion of various
partnership agreements as securities). In Kane v. Fischbach, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,608, at 92,988-89 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1982), a sale of less than 100%
of the shares in an automobile rebuilding business to the controlling partners of a partner-
ship was held not to be within the ambit of the federal securities laws. Id. The seller was a
controlling partner and was retained by the partnership as executive vice president. Id. at
92,985-86. The court held that the transfer was "nothing more than the sale of a small
business" by the seller because the purchasers had control over both the business and the
partnership. Id. at 92,989.
96 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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the meaning of the Acts. The same test, but with an inversion of
the significance of the results, could be utilized to evaluate transac-
tions involving shares of stock where the purchaser's role in the
business is vague or ambiguous.97 If the purchaser is found to be
supplying the "undeniably significant" managerial efforts, an in-
tent to manage, and thus a sale of business is established, thereby
precluding application of the federal securities laws.
CONCLUSION
Congress, in enacting the federal securities laws, intended to
protect those investors who possess a mere "indicia of ownership,"
with the power to control the business remaining in the hands of
others. A close reading of the legislative history reveals that there
was no intent to protect purchasers who obtain 100 percent of the
shares of a business and exercise control over it. In addition, this
class of purchasers has no reasonable basis to rely upon the protec-
tion of the '33 and '34 Acts.
The limited scope of the securities laws was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Forman and Marine Bank, which indicate that
an inquiry into the "economic reality" of the transaction is neces-
sary, even where the instrument in question possesses the usual
characteristics of corporate stock. The Golden decision, by fore-
closing an examination of the economic reality of the transaction if
the instrument carries the common characteristics of corporate
stock, expands the intended protection of the Acts and provides an
overlap of remedies for the purchaser of a business. This result is
clearly untenable in light of Forman and Marine Bank.
When an inquiry into the economic reality of the transaction
reveals ambiguity or vagueness concerning the purchaser's intent
to manage the business, the "managerial efforts" test created by
the Ninth Circuit can be employed to determine whether the pur-
chaser actually controls the business. Thus, in rejecting the sale of
business doctrine, the Second Circuit has discarded a pragmatic
and discerning approach that presents no undue difficulties of ap-
plication and properly limits the scope of the federal securities
laws.
Donald E. Miehls
97 Cf. McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 136 (1981) (sale of business doctrine not applicable because plaintiff-seller was an
employee who regarded his equity interest in the business as an investment).
1983]
